

Ogre et Pythia: An invariance proof method for weak consistency models

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Objective

Example

```
0: { w F1 false; w F2 false; w T 0; }
1: w[] F1 true
2: w[] T 2
3: do
5:   r[] R1 F2
6:   r[] R2 T
7: while R1  $\wedge$  R2  $\neq$  1
8:  $\neg$ at 28
9: w[] F1 false
10:
21: w[] F2 true;
22: w[] T 1;
23: do
25:   r[] R3 F1;
26:   r[] R4 T;
27: while R3  $\wedge$  R4  $\neq$  2;
28:  $\neg$ at 8
29: w[] F2 false;
39:
```

critical section

An invariance proof method for WCMs

- Extend Lamport's invariance proof method for parallel programs from **sequentially consistent** to **weak consistency models** so that
 - The **weak consistency model** is a *parameter* of the proof
 - We don't **have to redo the whole proof when *changing the consistency model***

Note: Owicki & Gries is Lamport with auxiliary variables instead of programs counters


Separating invariance from WCM

- The **invariance proof** (that a specification S_{inv} is invariant for a program):
 - Done for a **program consistency hypothesis** S_{com} :
 - Sufficient for the program to be correct
 - Or better, also necessary for correctness (weakest consistency model)
 - This program consistency hypothesis S_{com} is expressed as an invariant
 - Sound and (relatively) complete

Separating invariance from WCM

- Consistency proof:
 - a. The program consistency hypothesis S_{com} is strengthened into H_{com} written in a consistency specification language (e.g. cat)
 - b. A cat **architecture consistency model** M is shown to imply the cat program consistency model H_{com}
- only b. to be redone when changing the architecture
- sound but possibly incomplete

Methodology




The invariance proof
method is designed by
abstract interpretation of an
analytic semantics


Analytic semantics
=
Anarchic semantics
┌
Weak consistency model

The anarchic semantics


The anarchic semantics



The read-from relation rf



Cuts




Anarchic semantics of fences

- The anarchic semantics of (localized) fences is `skip` (the state is unmodified)
- Fences are `static marker events` used by the WCM in `cat` to restrict the read-from relation `rf`

The weak consistency model

Weak consistency models

- Put restrictions on the read-from relation rf
- e.g. **sequential consistency**: a read at a cut reads from that last write in a process before that cut



Difficulties

Naming entities

- Invariants are **logical formulæ**
- can only describe entities that they **name**
- L/O-G use the **name** of shared variables to designate their current **value** in invariants

Naming entities

- Invariants are **logical formulæ**
- can only describe entities that they **name**
- L/O-G use the **name** of shared variables to designate their current **value** in invariants

Difficulty

- Meaningless with WCMs since there is no notion of “the current value of a shared variable”

What is known on communications?

- Each process only knows the value of the shared variables from its last read
- Need to be named → Pythia Variables

What we know on communications?

- Each process only knows the value of the shared variables from its last read
- Need to be named → Pythia Variables

Difficulty

- Its **dynamic**, not static!
- A program read action can read from a different write each time it is executed → **Stamps** (abstraction of local time)

Back to the anarchic semantics

State

- Per process:
 - A **stamp** (local time, no global time)
 - A **program counter**
 - The **value of the local variables** (registers) of the process
 - The stamped **pythia variables** (uniquely identifying all reads along a trace)
 - The **value of the pythia variables** (what was read)
- The read-from relation (**rf**)

Example (Peterson)

0: { w F1 false; w F2 false; w T 0; }

P0:

1: w[] F1 true

2: w[] T 2

3: do {i}

4: r[] R1 F2 { \rightsquigarrow F2₄ⁱ}

5: r[] R2 T { \rightsquigarrow T₅ⁱ}

6: while R1 \wedge R2 \neq 1 {i_{end}}

7: skip (* CS1 *)

8: w[] F1 false

P1:

10: w[] F2 true;

11: w[] T 1;

12: do {j}

13: r[] R3 F1; { \rightsquigarrow F1₁₃^j}

14: r[] R4 T; { \rightsquigarrow T₁₄^j}

15: while R3 \wedge R4 \neq 2; {j_{end}}

16: skip (* CS2 *)

17: w[] F2 false;

Stamps (loop counters)

Stamps (on loop exit)

Example (Peterson)

0: { w F1 false; w F2 false; w T 0; }

P0:

1: w[] F1 true

2: w[] T 2

3: do {i}

4: r[] R1 F2 { \rightsquigarrow $F2_4^i$ }

5: r[] R2 T { \rightsquigarrow T_5^i }

6: while R1 \wedge R2 \neq 1 {i_end}

7: skip (* CS1 *)

8: w[] F1 false

P1:

10: w[] F2 true;

11: w[] T 1;

12: do {j}

13: r[] R3 F1; { \rightsquigarrow $F1_{13}^j$ }

14: r[] R4 T; { \rightsquigarrow T_{14}^j }

15: while R3 \wedge R4 \neq 2; {j_end}

16: skip (* CS2 *)

17: w[] F2 false;

Stamps (loop counters)

Stamps (on loop exit)

Pythia variables

The abstraction

The invariance abstraction

- For each **process**

The invariance abstraction

- For each **process**
 - For each **program point** of that process

The invariance abstraction

- For each **process**
- For each **program point** of that process
- For each **execution** of the program

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 - For each **cut** of that execution going through the program point of that process

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collect:

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collect:

- The **states of all processes**, and

The invariance abstraction

- For each **process**
- For each **program point** of that process
- For each **execution** of the program
 - For each **cut** of that execution going through the program point of that process

collect:

- The **states of all processes**, and
- The **read-from relation** **rf**

Example: Peterson

```

0: { w F1 false; w F2 false; w T 0; }
  {F1=false ∧ F2=false ∧ T=0} }
1: {R1=0 ∧ R2=0}
   w[] F1 true
2: {R1=0 ∧ R2=0}
   w[] T 2
3: {R1=0 ∧ R2=0}
   do {i}
4: {(i=0 ∧ R1=0 ∧ R2=0) ∨
    (i>0 ∧ R1=F24i-1 ∧ R2=T5i-1)}
   r[] R1 F2 {↗ F24i}
5: {R1=F24i ∧ (i=0 ∧ R2=0) ∨
    (i>0 ∧ R2=T5i-1)}
   r[] R2 T {↗ T5i}
6: {R1=F24i ∧ R2=T5i}
   while R1 ∧ R2≠1 {iend}
7: {¬F24iend ∨ T5iend=1}
   skip (* CS1 *)
8: {¬F24iend ∨ T5iend=1}
   w[] F1 false
9: {¬F24iend ∨ T5iend=1}

```

```

10: {R3=0 ∧ R4=0}
    w[] F2 true;
11: {R3=0 ∧ R4=0}
    w[] T 1;
12: {R3=0 ∧ R4=0}
    do {j}
13: {(j=0 ∧ R3=0 ∧ R4=0) ∨
    (j>0 ∧ R3=F113j-1 ∧ R4=T14j-1)}
    r[] R3 F1 {↗ F113j};
14: {R3=F113j ∧ (j=0 ∧ R4=0) ∨
    (j>0 ∧ R4=T14j-1)}
    r[] R4 T; {↗ T14j}
15: {R3=F113j ∧ R4=T14j}
    while R3 ∧ R4≠2 {jend} ;
16: {¬F113jend ∨ T14jend=2}
    skip (* CS2 *)
17: {¬F113jend ∨ T14jend=2}
    w[] F2 false;
18: {¬F113jend ∨ T14jend=2}

```

Example: Peterson

0: { w F1 false; w F2 false; w T 0; }

{F1=false \wedge F2=false \wedge T=0} }

1: {R1=0 \wedge R2=0}

w[] F1 true

2: {R1=0 \wedge R2=0}

w[] T 2

3:

4: { (i=0 \wedge R1=0 \wedge R2=0) \vee
 (i>0 \wedge R1=F2₄ⁱ⁻¹ \wedge R2=T₅ⁱ⁻¹) }

5: {R1=F2₄ⁱ \wedge (i=0 \wedge R2=0) \vee
 (i>0 \wedge R2=T₅ⁱ⁻¹)}

r[] R2 T { \rightsquigarrow T₅ⁱ}

6: {R1=F2₄ⁱ \wedge R2=T₅ⁱ}

while R1 \wedge R2 \neq 1 {iend}

7: { \neg F2₄^{iend} \vee T₅^{iend}=1}

skip (* CS1 *)

8: { \neg F2₄^{iend} \vee T₅^{iend}=1}

w[] F1 false

9: { \neg F2₄^{iend} \vee T₅^{iend}=1}

10: {R3=0 \wedge R4=0}

w[] F2 true;

11: {R3=0 \wedge R4=0}

w[] T 1;

14: {R3=F1₁₃^j \wedge (j=0 \wedge R4=0) \vee
 (j>0 \wedge R4=T₁₄^{j-1})}

r[] R4 T; { \rightsquigarrow T₁₄^j}

15: {R3=F1₁₃^j \wedge R4=T₁₄^j}

while R3 \wedge R4 \neq 2 {jend} ;

16: { \neg F1₁₃^{jend} \vee T₁₄^{jend}=2}

skip (* CS2 *)

17: { \neg F1₁₃^{jend} \vee T₁₄^{jend}=2}

w[] F2 false;

18: { \neg F1₁₃^{jend} \vee T₁₄^{jend}=2}

The calculational design of the verification conditions by abstract interpretation

The induction principle

- Given an invariance specification S_{inv} find a **stronger inductive invariant** S_{ind}
- Prove that S_{ind} satisfy verification conditions
 - Holds after initialization
 - Remains true after a computation step
 - Remains true after a communication
- Assuming S_{com} / H_{com}

The induction principle

- Given an invariance specification S_{inv} find a **stronger inductive invariant** S_{ind}
- Prove that S_{ind} satisfy verification conditions
 - Holds after initialization
 - Remains true after a computation step
 - Remains true after a communication
- Assuming S_{com} / H_{com}

Verification conditions =
abstraction of the
concrete transformer
for one computation
step

Calculational design of the verification conditions

$$\begin{aligned}
& \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[[P]])) \subseteq S_{inv} \\
\Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(\{\xi \in S^a[[P]] \mid S[[H_{com}]]\xi = \text{allowed}\}) \subseteq S_{inv} \quad \{\text{def. } \alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]]\} \\
\Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]] \cap \{\xi \in S^a[[P]] \mid S[[H_{com}]]\xi = \text{allowed}\}) \subseteq S_{inv} \quad \{\text{def. } \cap\} \\
\Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]]) \cap \alpha_{inv}(\{\xi \in \Xi \mid S[[H_{com}]]\xi = \text{allowed}\}) \subseteq S_{inv} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \{\text{since } \alpha_{inv} \text{ preserves intersections}\} \\
\Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]]) \dot{\cap} \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[[P]])) \subseteq S_{inv} \quad \{\text{def. } \alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]]\} \\
\Leftrightarrow & \exists S_{com} . \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]]) \dot{\cap} S_{com} \subseteq S_{inv} \wedge \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[[P]])) \subseteq S_{com} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \{\text{(\Leftarrow) For soundness, we have } \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]]) \dot{\cap} \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[[P]])) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \subseteq \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]]) \dot{\cap} S_{com} \subseteq S_{inv}; \\
& \quad \quad \quad (\Rightarrow) \text{ For completeness, we choose to describe exactly the communica-} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{tions that is } S_{com} = \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[[P]]))\} \\
\Leftrightarrow & \exists S_{com} . (S_{com} \Rightarrow S_{inv}) \wedge (H_{com} \Rightarrow S_{com}) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{by defining the conditional invariance proof } S_{com} \Rightarrow S_{inv} \text{ to be} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \alpha_{inv}(S^a[[P]]) \dot{\cap} S_{com} \subseteq S_{inv} \text{ and the inclusion proof } H_{com} \Rightarrow S_{com} \text{ to} \\
& \quad \quad \quad \text{be } \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[[P]])) \subseteq S_{com}. \\
& \quad \quad \quad \dots \\
& \quad \quad \quad \dots \\
& \quad \quad \quad \dots
\end{aligned}$$

Computational design of the verification conditions

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[P])) \subseteq S_{inv} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(\{\xi \in S^a[P] \mid S[[H_{com}]]\xi = \text{allowed}\}) \subseteq S_{inv} \quad \{\text{def. } \alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]]\} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(S^a[P] \cap \{\xi \in S^a[P] \mid S[[H_{com}]]\xi = \text{allowed}\}) \subseteq S_{inv} \quad \{\text{def. } \cap\} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{inv}(S^a[P]) \cap \alpha_{inv}(\{\xi \in \Xi \mid S[[H_{com}]]\xi = \text{allowed}\}) \subseteq S_{inv}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists S_{com} . (S_{com} \Rightarrow S_{inv}) \wedge (H_{com} \Rightarrow S_{com})$$

(\Rightarrow) For completeness, we choose to describe exactly the communications that is $S_{com} = \alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[P]))$.

$$\Leftrightarrow \exists S_{com} . (S_{com} \Rightarrow S_{inv}) \wedge (H_{com} \Rightarrow S_{com})$$

by defining the conditional invariance proof $S_{com} \Rightarrow S_{inv}$ to be $\alpha_{inv}(S^a[P]) \cap S_{com} \subseteq S_{inv}$ and the inclusion proof $H_{com} \Rightarrow S_{com}$ to be $\alpha_{inv}(\alpha_{ana}[[H_{com}]](S^a[P])) \subseteq S_{com}$.

...

...

...

Verification conditions


- **Sequential** proof
- **Non-interference** proof
(like L/O-G but for different kind of invariants)
- **Communication** proof
 - a read event reading from a write event must be in **rf**
 - the value read for a variable is the one written
 - reading is fair in **rf** (cannot be delayed indefinitely)
 - ...

(useless in L/O-G since rf is fixed)

The program consistency hypothesis S_{com}

Communication hypothesis S_{com}

- A **sufficient communication hypothesis** can be discovered by calculational design:



- i.e. $(S_{ind} \wedge \neg S_{inv}) \implies \neg S_{com}$
- Necessary: by counter examples

Proving Consistency

$$\begin{array}{ccc} H_{com} & \implies & S_{com} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \text{cat} & & \text{invariant} \end{array}$$

Proof method

- Obtained by calculational design:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \alpha_{\text{inv}}(\alpha_{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]](S^{\text{a}}[[\mathbf{P}]]) \dot{\subseteq} S_{\text{com}} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \alpha_{\text{inv}}(S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P}) \dot{\subseteq} S_{\text{com}} && \{\text{def. } S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P}\} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \forall \xi \in S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P} . \alpha_{\text{inv}}(\{\xi\}) \dot{\subseteq} S_{\text{com}} && \{\alpha_{\text{inv}} \text{ preserves } \cup\} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \forall \xi \in S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P} . \bigcup_{p=1}^n \bigcup_{L \in \mathbf{P}_p} \{\alpha_{\text{inv}}(\xi')_p(L) \mid \xi' \in \{\xi\}\} \dot{\subseteq} S_{\text{com}} && \{\text{def. (19) of } \alpha_{\text{inv}}\} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \forall (\tau_{\text{start}} \times \prod_{p=0}^{n-1} \tau_p \times \pi \times \text{rf}) \in S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P} . \forall p \in [1, n] . \forall L \in \mathbf{P}_p . \\
 & \alpha_{\text{inv}}(\tau_{\text{start}} \times \prod_{p=0}^{n-1} \tau_p \times \pi \times \text{rf})_p(L) \subseteq S_{\text{com } p}(L) \\
 & \{\text{def. } \in, \dot{\cup}, \dot{\subseteq}, \text{ and } S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P} \text{ so that } \xi \text{ has the form } \xi = \\
 & \tau_{\text{start}} \times \prod_{p=0}^{n-1} \tau_p \times \pi \times \text{rf}. \text{ By def. (19) of } \alpha_{\text{inv}} \text{ and } \subseteq, \text{ we} \\
 & \text{get}\} \\
 \Leftrightarrow & \forall (\tau_{\text{start}} \times \prod_{p=0}^{n-1} \tau_p \times \pi \times \text{rf}) \in S^{\text{ana}}[[H_{\text{com}}]]\mathbf{P} . \forall i \in && (20) \\
 & [1, n] . \forall L \in \mathbf{P}_p . \forall q \in [0, n[. \forall k_q < |\tau_q| . \\
 & (\tau_{q, k_q} = \mathfrak{s}\langle \kappa_{q, k_q}, \theta_{q, k_q}, \rho_{q, k_q}, \nu_{q, k_q} \rangle \wedge \kappa_{p, k_p} = L) \Rightarrow \\
 & \langle \kappa_{0, k_0}, \theta_{0, k_0}, \rho_{0, k_0}, \nu_{0, k_0}, \dots, \nu_{p-1, k_{p-1}}, \theta_{p, k_p}, \rho_{p, k_p}, \nu_{p, k_p}, \\
 & \kappa_{p+1, k_{p+1}}, \dots, \kappa_{n-1, k_{n-1}}, \theta_{n-1, k_{n-1}}, \rho_{n-1, k_{n-1}}, \nu_{n-1, k_{n-1}}, \text{rf} \rangle \\
 & \in S_{\text{com } i}(L)
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof method


- The **anarchic invariants** can be used to calculate all communication scenarios violating S_{com}
- These scenarios must be **forbidden by the cat specification** H_{com}

(no need to reason at the level of traces of the anarchic semantics)

Example (Peterson)


Communication scenarios violating S_{com} for Peterson

$$S_{com} \triangleq \neg[\exists i, j. [rf\langle F2_4^i, 0, false \rangle \vee rf\langle F2_4^i, 17, false \rangle \vee rf\langle T_5^i, 11, 1 \rangle] \wedge [rf\langle F1_{13}^j, 0, false \rangle \vee rf\langle F1_{13}^j, 8, false \rangle \vee rf\langle T_{14}^j, 2, 2 \rangle]]$$



Incompleteness

- In general you have to add fences for H_{com} (do not change the invariants, S_{inv} , S_{ind} , and S_{com} remain valid)
- S_{com} can refer to communicated values not H_{com} in cat (redesign your algorithm without assuming that the hardware does know about communicated values)
- cat may not be expressive enough:



No read
beyond cut

Proving Architectural Consistency

$$\begin{array}{ccc} M & \Rightarrow & H_{com} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \text{cat} & & \text{cat} \end{array}$$

$M \Rightarrow H_{com}$ in cat

- sound and complete proof method
- unpublished paper of JA and PC with Luc Maranget

Beyond L/O-G: non-starvation

Reasoning on one execution only

- A particular execution can be uniquely characterized by its read-from relation rf
- We can reason on one execution only (S_{com} for this execution + S_{ind})
- Not directly possible with L/O-G
- Can be used to prove non-starvation

Non-starvation (e.g. PostgrSQL)

- Consider **all traces that may starve** (for an appropriate S'_{com} for each trace)
- Prove each of them to be **infeasible**:
 - the inductive invariant S_{ind} under the program communication hypothesis S_{com} is unsatisfied
 - or, by strengthening the program communications S_{com} (maybe implemented by adding fences in H_{com})
 - or, by a fairness hypothesis.

Communication fairness hypothesis^(*)

- All writes eventually hit the memory:
 - If, at a cut of the execution, all the processes infinitely often write the same value v to a shared variable x and only that value v
 - and from a later cut point of that execution, a process infinitely often repeats reads to that variable x
 - then the reads will end up reading that value v

^(*)The SPARC Architecture Manual, Version 8, Section K2, p. 283: “if one processor does an S , and another processor repeatedly does L ’s to the same location, then there is an L that will be after the S ”.

Conclusion

Conclusion

- To **design** a correct parallel algorithm, specify:
 - the algorithm
 - the invariance specification S_{inv}
 - the program-specific consistency model S_{com}
- Find an **anarchic inductive invariant** S_{ind} satisfying the verification conditions such that $(S_{com} \wedge S_{ind}) \implies S_{inv}$

Conclusion

- To **implement** a parallel algorithm correctly:
 - Implement the program consistency model on an architecture consistency model M (possibly adding fences)
 - Prove $M \implies S_{com}$
- Or better
 - Find a minimal/weakest H_{com} such that $H_{com} \implies S_{com}$
 - $M \implies H_{com}$

More work needed

- Specification of parallel/distributed program consistency models (more refined than architecture consistency models, e.g. cuts needed)
- Liveness (beyond non-starvation)
- Collection of certified algorithms for WCM (e.g. transactional memory, databases, etc)
- Static analysis (by abstract interpretation of the analytic semantics parameterized by a WCM)

The End, Thank You